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Constitutional Judiciary in the Republic of
Macedonia under the shadow of its Fiftieth
Anniversary-Situation and Prospects
Jeton SHASIVARI1
Abstract: In this paper, the author analyzes the position, prospects and challenges of the
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia, in light of the fiftieth anniversary of the existence
of this institution which in the socialist past suffered from complete marginalization, and people’s
conscience of its significance is yet to be built. This article aims to explain and assess the
constitutional concept of the Constitutional Court of this country as a public authority which consists
of the organizational and functional aspects. The organizational aspect involves the composition of
the Constitutional Court, the election of the judges and their legal position. The functional aspect
involves the issue of jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, the legal procedure for carrying out such
responsibilities and the legal effect of its decisions. Finally, the paper refers to the functioning of the
Constitutional Court in the period 2008-2012, analyzing statistical data on the structure of the Court's
decisions by various parameters, by highlighting the relevant findings on its situation and prospects.
Keywords: judicial review; constitutional jurisdiction; comparative aspects of the constitutional
justice
“The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a
level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please
to alter it. ...If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the
constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the
part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature illimitable.”
Chief Justice John Marshall
1. General Historical and Theoretical Aspects
According to the practical approach, the first form of judicial review of the
constitutionality appeared in the United States of America in the dispute case
Marbury vs. Madison (1803). This dispute was presented when John Adams was
the second President of the United States (1797-1801) after George Washington.
Adams which was a prominent federalist lost the 1800 elections by his former vice-
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president, the Republican Thomas Jefferson. Adams being removed from the office
used this period of the delivery of the function by appointing some individuals for
judges by his party. The US Congress confirmed those appointments but, then
Secretary of State, James Madison refused to give certificates. One of the judges
appointed by this way was William Marbury who asked the Supreme Court to
order Madison to give the certificate.
The chairman of the Supreme Court was the well-known judge John Marshall,
which although was a relative of Jefferson, they were political opponents. Marshall
proposed to other judges the approach that Marbury became a judge according to
the fact that he was appointed by the President. Thus, in the judgment that was
pronounced unanimously, Marshall presents the issue of the constitutionality of the
law, with the question that can a law that contradicts to the country's constitution,
become law, answering that the constitution or is the higher law that cannot be
changed by ordinary means or is the ordinary legislative act and can be modified as
other acts, and finally concluding that, it is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is. Thus, by this precedent, the Supreme
Court earned the right to decide on the constitutionality of laws and other acts if
they exceed the powers prescribed by the Constitution.
Thus, through the above-mentioned case, came into effect the principle that the
Supreme Court not to enforce federal law if it considers that it is contrary to the
Constitution, by which this court became the exclusive interpreter of the U.S.
Constitution. So today, the doctrine on which the constitutional justice is supported
is known as the: “Marshalls Doctrine”1. According to the theoretical approach,
judicial review of the constitutionality is based on the legal observation of Hans
Kelsen (founder of the constitutional court) which underlines that, a constitution
that is missing the guarantee of nullification of unconstitutional acts is not, in a
theoretical sense, completely binding. (Kelsen, 1928)
Regarding the historical aspect of constitutional justice in the Republic of
Macedonia, it should be noted that the constitutional judiciary in the Republic of
Macedonia for the first time, was inaugurated by the Constitution of the Socialist
Republic of Macedonia in 1963 (as a federal unit of former Yugoslavia), whereas,
the Constitutional Court was established and began operation in 1964. In this
regard, it is worth noting that prior to the incorporation of the Constitutional Court,
1 For more on this case, see: Reinstein, J. Robert and Mark C. Rahdert Marbury's Myths: John
Marshall, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law”, 2004, available at:
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1557&context=expresso.
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as a function of its carrier, was the representative body (the legislature) because as
the creator of the law it was also considered as the creator of the constitutionality
of the law itself, which featured an all accepted model in the former communist
systems based on the principle of unity of power. In this regard, the basic need for
the formation of the Constitutional Court consisted in determining the competence
of the courts in administrative cases, whereby the inauguration of an administrative
dispute respectively judicial control of the legality of the individual legal acts,
completed the ordinary judiciary functions including so criminal law, civil law and
administrative law1.
Regarding the principal aspects, the Constitutional Court is more related to the
principle of the rule of law than the principle of separation of powers, which is
logical because the rule of law is a principle broader than that of the separation of
powers.
The Constitutional Court is a state body with a higher authority because its
decisions are binding on all other subjects without the right of appeal, in which
derives its authority from its right to revoke or annul unconstitutional laws and
other provisions, while, on the other hand, the Constitutional Court is independent
from other state bodies, such as Parliament, the Government, the President of the
Republic and the ordinary courts, and also from the laws because they may be
abrogated or annulled if are not in accordance with the state Constitution so, the
Constitutional Court only depend on the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia
because it is the guarantor of its implementation, but, in this regard, the legislative
and the executive power can be protected from the empire of the Constitutional
Court only through the issuance of new constitutional amendments or complete
change of the state Constitution. (Škarič, &Davkova-Siljanovska, 2009, pp. 699-
700)
The constitutional concept of the Constitutional Court as a public authority consists
of the organizational and functional aspects. The organizational aspect involves the
composition of the Constitutional Court, the election of the judges and their legal
position. The functional aspect involves the issue of jurisdiction of the
Constitutional Court, the legal procedure for carrying out such responsibilities,
which means the passing laws in their jurisdiction and the legal effect of the
decisions of this court. Part IV of the Articles 108-113 of the Constitution of RM
1 The web page of the Constitutional Court of Republic of Macedonia, available at:
http://www.ustavensud.mk/domino/WEBSUD.nsf.
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regulates these issues1. The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, determines
the Constitutional Court as a specialized body for the protection of constitutionality
and legality, unlike the previous constitution of 1974, which this court defined as
limited protector of constitutionality and legality.
2. The Organizational Aspects of the Constitutional Court of RM
The issue concerning the election of judges to the Constitutional Court is regulated
by the Constitution of the RM, namely the provision of Article 68 which regulates
the functions of the Parliament of RM, where among other, specifies that,
Parliament elects the judges of the Constitutional Court. Also, in this regard, in
chapter six of the Constitution, which is dedicated to the Constitutional court,
Article 109 stipulates that, the Parliament elects the judges of the Constitutional
Court. The Parliament elects six of the judges to the Constitutional Court by a
majority vote of the total number of Representatives.
The Parliament elects three of the judges by a majority vote of the total number of
Representatives, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the total
number of Representatives who belong to the communities not in the majority in
the population of Macedonia. The term of office of the judges is nine years without
the right to re-election. Judges of the Constitutional Court are elected from the
ranks of outstanding members of the legal profession.
However, the term “outstanding member” as a constitutional condition that must be
met, remains vague and imprecise, therefore, needs a closer qualification in the
future, for example, more than a few years of professional experience in the field of
law, as for example, the Constitution of Kosovo, which stipulates that the
Constitutional Court shall be composed of nine judges who shall be distinguished
jurists of the highest moral character, with not less than ten years of relevant
professional experience2 or the Constitution of Bulgaria, which stipulates that the
judges of the Constitutional Court shall be lawyers of high professional and moral
integrity and with at least fifteen years of professional experience3. As noted by
Professor Jovan Djordjevič: “A judge of the Constitutional Court is not an ordinary
1 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia (17 November 1991), available at:
http://www.sobranie.mk/en/default-en.asp?ItemID=9F7452BF44EE814B8DB897C1858B71FF.
2 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (15 June 2008) Article 114, available at: http://www.gjk-
ks.org/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf.
3 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria (12 July 1991) Article 147, available at:
http://www.constcourt.bg/Pages/LegalBasis/default.aspx?VerID=221.
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lawyer or whatever successful “official”, because they are usually deadly for the
reputation of the court. Constitutional Court judges must be both a lawyer of great
culture and professional knowledge, and human dignity and moral support to the
general public. A man who is respected, who listens and who is appreciated. This
judge can only provide standards that are required for the assessment and
protection of constitutionality”. (Djordjević, 1986, p. 19)
It should be noted that the composition of the Constitutional Court of RM is set by
three state bodies, including: the Parliament of RM (as its commission for elections
and appointments proposes five candidates for judges of the Constitutional Court),
President of the Republic (as proposed two candidates for judges of the
Constitutional Court-Article 84, paragraph 4 of the Constitution) and the Judicial
Council of the RM (since proposes two candidates for judges of the Constitutional
Court-Article 105, paragraph 4 of the Constitution).
Hereinafter, Article 111 of the Constitution stipulates that, the office of judge of
the Constitutional Court is incompatible with the performance of other public
office, profession or membership in a political party. Judges of the Constitutional
Court are granted immunity. The Constitutional Court decides on their immunity.
Judges of the Constitutional Court cannot be called up for duties in the Armed
Forces. The office of a judge of the Constitutional Court ceases when the
incumbent resigns. A judge of the Constitutional Court shall be discharged from
office if sentenced for a criminal offence to unconditional imprisonment of a
minimum of six months, or if he/she permanently loses the capability of
performing his/her office, as determined by the Constitutional Court.
As seen, the Republic of Macedonia in terms of the role of the Parliament in the
election of judges of the Constitutional Court, belongs to the group of states where
the Parliament has an exclusive power to elect judges of the Constitutional Court.
According to a comparative study of this issue by Tudorel Toader and Marieta
Safta1, this group of states also includes: Germany, where all constitutional judges
are appointed by the Parliament; Switzerland, where the federal Parliament elects
the judges of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, based on proposal by the Judicial
Committee; Poland, where the fifteen constitutional judges are individually
appointed for a nine-year term of office, by the first Chamber of Parliament;
1 Tudorel Toader and Marieta Safta, “Constitutional Justice: Functions and Relationship with the
other Public Authorities”, General report prepared for the fifteenth Congress of the Conference of
European Constitutional Courts by the Constitutional Court of Romania, 2011, p. 1, available at:
http://193.226.121.81/congres/raportgeneraleng.pdf.
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Hungary, where the eleven constitutional justices are elected by the Parliament;
Croatia, where all thirteen justices are elected by the Parliament; Montenegro,
where the Constitutional Court judges are appointed by the Parliament; Lithuania,
where all justices of the Constitutional Court are appointed by the institution of
legislature. In this regard, it is important to mention the other four comparative
constitutional solutions to this issue, based on the above study (Toader & Safta,
2011) respectively, the group of the states where the Parliament appoints part of the
judges to the Constitutional Court: as in France, where all nine members of the
Constitutional Council are appointed for a nine-year term of office, three of them
being replaced every three years.
Upon each renewal, one appointment is made by the President of the Republic, the
president of the National Assembly, and the president of the Senate; Latvia, where
the seven judges of the Constitutional Court validated by the Parliament, three are
proposed by at least ten members of the Parliament; Moldova, where the procedure
for appointing judges to the Constitutional Court takes account of the principle of
separation of powers, thus, two judges are appointed by the Parliament, two by the
Government and two by the Superior Council of Magistracy; Portugal, where the
Parliament appoints ten out of the thirteen judges; Romania, where three judges are
appointed by the Chamber of Deputies, three by the Senate, and three by the
President of Romania; Spain, where of the twelve constitutional judges, four are
appointed by the Congress of Deputies and four by the Senate; Armenia, where the
National Assembly appoints five of the nine members of the Constitutional Court;
Belarus, where of the twelve constitutional judges, the Council of the Republic
(one of the Houses of Parliament) elects six and gives consent to the appointment
of the Chairperson of the Constitutional Court; the other six are appointed by the
President of the Republic; Turkey, where three of the seventeen justices of the
Constitutional Court are elected by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, while
the others are selected by the President of the Republic from different sources
(members of the judiciary and high public officials).
Onward, the group of states where Parliament appoints constitutional judges based
on proposal of the Head of State, as in: Russia, where the judges of the
Constitutional Court are appointed by the Federation Council by secret ballot, upon
the submission of the President of the Russian Federation; Slovenia, where judges
of the Constitutional Court are elected by the National Assembly, by secret ballot
and with a majority vote of all Deputies, on the proposal by the President of the
Republic; Azerbaijan, where the appointment of Constitutional Court’s judges is
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made by the Parliament, based on recommendation by the President of the
Republic. The group of states where the Parliament makes proposals to the Head of
the State with respect to the appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court, as
in: Austria, where the constitutional judges are appointed by the Federal President
who, however, is bound by the recommendations made by the other constitutional
bodies; Belgium, where all twelve judges of the Constitutional Court are appointed
by the King based on a list that is alternatively presented to him by the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
The group of states where Parliament gives its consent in connection with
proposals of the Head of State concerning the appointment of judges to the
Constitutional Court, as in: Albania, where the members of the Constitutional
Court are appointed by the President of the Republic, with the consent of the
Assembly; Czech Republic, where the Constitutional Court’s judges are appointed
by the President of the Republic, with the consent of the Senate.
And, the group of states where Parliament does not participate in the appointment
of judges to the Constitutional Court, as in: Luxembourg, where the Parliament is
not involved in the procedure of appointment of judges; Ireland, where the
Parliament has no direct role in the appointment of justices to the Supreme Court;
Cyprus, where the President of the Republic makes the appointment of judges to
the Supreme; Malta, where the President of the state appoints all members of the
Judiciary on the advice of the Prime Minister.
In this regard, it should be noted that the current constitutional settlement on the
election of constitutional judges in the Republic of Macedonia, is not immune to
political and party interference to activity of the court which is due to the fact that
Parliament as a holder of legislative power, elects all the judges, whereby the
President of the Republic as the executive branch proposes two of them.
So, in the near future, must be assumed that, according to the principle of
separation of powers, to find an adequate and balanced solution to prevent political
influence of the legislative and executive power on the Constitutional Court, for
example, three judges to be elected by Parliament, three judges to be elected by
President of the Republic and three judges to be elected by the Judicial Council of
the RM from among the judges, because the best form for election of the judges is
when all three segments of the state power (legislative, executive and judicial) are
equally involved in this process. In this way, the possible influence of other
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branches of the power would be weaker, while, on the other hand, is expected to
strengthen the independence of the Constitutional Court.
The Bulgarian Constitution provides such a solution, which determines that the
Constitutional Court shall consist of 12 judges, one-third of who shall be elected by
the National Assembly, one-third shall be appointed by the President, and one-third
shall be elected by a joint meeting of the judges of the Supreme Court of Cassation
and the Supreme Administrative Court1.
3. The functional Aspects of the Constitutional Court of RM
3. 1. The Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court and the Legal Effect of its
Decisions
The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is regulated by Article 110 of the
Constitution, which stipulates that the Constitutional Court of the Republic of
Macedonia: decides on the conformity of laws with the Constitution; decides on the
conformity of collective agreements and other regulations with the Constitution
and laws; protects the freedoms and rights of the individual and citizen relating to
the freedom of conviction, conscience, thought and public expression of thought,
political association and activity as well as to the prohibition of discrimination
among citizens on the ground of sex, race, religion or national, social or political
affiliation; decides on conflicts of competency among holders of legislative,
executive and judicial offices; decides on conflicts of competency among Republic
bodies and units of local self-government; decides on the responsibility of the
President of the Republic; and decides on the constitutionality of the programs and
statutes of political parties and associations of citizens.
On the other hand, Article 112 of the Constitution regulates the legal effect of its
decisions, which states that the Constitutional Court shall abrogate or annul a law if
it determines that the law does not conform to the Constitution. The Constitutional
Court shall abrogate or annul a collective agreement, other regulation or enactment,
statute or program of a political party or association, if it determines that the same
does not conform to the Constitution or law. The decisions of the Constitutional
Court are final and executive.
1 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria (12 July 1991) Article 147, available at:
http://www.constcourt.bg/Pages/LegalBasis/default.aspx?VerID=221.
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In comparative terms, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia, has
no jurisdiction in the following issues: To decide on the petitions of
unconstitutionality brought by citizens against acts amending the Constitution and
on the constitutionality of international treaties and the laws approving them, as it
has these functions, for example, the Constitutional Court of Colombia (one of the
world's most active courts); To solve the constitutional disputes regarding the
violation of the fundamental rights of citizens, which are initiated through
constitutional complaint (recursos de amparo), an institute which is well known in
Switzerland, Germany, Spain and Austria; Unlike the constitutional courts in
Austria, Germany and Italy, the Constitutional Court of RM has no function to
decide on criminal responsibility of ministers and other stakeholders to state
functions but, for this decides the ordinary courts; Unlike the constitutional courts
of Germany, Serbia and Croatia, the Constitutional Court of the RM is not
competent to stop the political party or association that acts contrary to the
Constitution, because this decision is issued by the ordinary courts; Constitutional
Court of the RM has no function in the resolution of disputes relating to the
elections as this is the case with the courts of Austria, Germany, France and
Croatia, because in RM these disputes are under the jurisdiction of the electoral
commissions and the Administrative Court; Constitutional Court of RM has no
function to solve the constitutional disputes on withdrawal rights which are
guaranteed by the Constitution, as for example in Germany, where the
constitutional court can deprive or restrict the basic rights of those individuals who
abuse the freedom of expression of opinion, freedom of association, the right to
asylum, etc.; Constitutional Court of RM does not have jurisdiction to provide legal
opinion on certain constitutional issues, as for example in Germany, where the
Federal Constitutional Court at the request of both parliamentary chambers and the
Federal government provides legal opinions on certain constitutional issues;
Constitutional Court of RM has not the function of binding interpretation of the
Constitution, as for example in Austria, where the Constitutional Court gives
preliminary mandatory constitutional interpretations, at the request of the Federal
government or the governments of the federal entities, when determining that the
adoption of the law, is within the competence of the federation or the federal unit.
The normative control of general legal acts constitutes the basic function of the
Constitutional Court of RM which is realized in two levels: the control of the
constitutionality of laws and control of constitutionality and legality of regulations
and other general acts. This control is general because it includes all general legal
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acts, with the exception of constitutional amendments (because they have the
power of the Constitution) and international agreements (because according to the
Constitution of the RM, international law has primacy over its domestic law).
The control of the constitutionality of laws includes all kinds of laws and the
control of constitutionality and legality of regulations and other general acts
include: sub-legal provisions (such as the Government decrees and decisions,
guidelines, instructions and regulations of state administration bodies, etc.) and
general acts that are more in number (such as municipal statutes, decisions and
conclusions of the municipal councils; acts of public institutions, laws and
regulations of educational and health institutions, etc., statutes and regulations of
public enterprises and collective employment contracts, declarations, resolutions
and recommendations of the Parliament of RM, etc.).
Normative control of constitutionality and legality is realized in the form of
abstract dispute, because the dispute before the Constitutional Court is guided
between general legal norms, because it is not concrete dispute between people.
In terms of consequences, court decisions can abrogate or annul. With the decision
to abrogate the law or other regulations or other general legal act shall cease to
apply from the moment of publication of the decision of the Constitutional Court in
the “Official Gazette” meaning that repeal acts (ex nunc)-since now i.e. only in the
future, meaning that excludes the existence of the unconstitutional act for the
future, well, without retroactive effect.
On the other hand, with the decision to annul, Constitutional Court nullifies not
only the act, but also all the consequences caused by its practical application until
the moment of the decision, well this kind of decision acts (ex tunc)-since then,
respectively, from the day of entry into force of the unconstitutional act meaning
that the decision to annul has a retroactive effect because it cancels the effects. In
this regard, the Court's decisions are final because they cannot be hit by an appeal
which means that, unlike regular court proceedings, proceedings before the
Constitutional Court is a one stage procedure, because the court decides in the first
and the last instance, and therefore it should have a special care not to err because
there is no remedy and extraordinary tools against its decisions.
In terms of performance, decisions of the Constitutional Court are enforceable
because they begin to be realized immediately after publication in the “Official
Gazette of RM”, and in case of resistance or ignoring the execution of the
Constitutional Court decisions, then their execution are provided by the
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Government of RM as an executive power. So, Constitutional Court decisions are
binding as well as laws, however the Court's decisions do not mean new law
regulating because in this way the Constitutional Court would embrace the function
of the legislature, but the decision to change the new law or regulation remains a
matter of legislators, therefore, the Constitutional Court represents a “negative
legislator”1.
4. The Functioning of the Constitutional Court of RM in the Period 2008-2012
The Constitution of RM contains no provisions on how to initiate court
proceedings, because according to Article 113 of the Constitution, the
Constitutional court regulates itself the procedure and the mode of its work by an
its enactment, which is done with the Rules of Procedure of 1992, under which, the
procedure starts with the decision of the Court on the basis of the initiative which
anyone can do (actio popularis), i.e. every citizen and any legal person in RM,
whereby the Court itself may initiate proceedings on its own initiative. Regarding
the issue what kind of legal act should regulate the organization and functioning of
the Court (the law or the Rule of the Court), there are divergent opinions between
practice and theory in RM, respectively, on the one hand, it’s the supportive
opinion by Igor Spirovski (former constitutional judge) which states that: “The
strongest guarantee of the independence of the Constitutional Court as an
institution is its regulatory autonomy allocated to it by the Constitution. Unlike in
the other countries, the legal sources of the position and the work of the
Constitutional Court are the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure of the
Constitutional Court.
This constitutional solution proved to be a key guarantee of its independence in a
time of strong pressures and clear desires and attempts to limit the power of the
Court that would not have been possible if it would have depended on the
Parliament”2. On the other hand, it’s the dissenting opinion of the professor
Treneska which states that: “The constitutional provisions, which are too basic and
too modest, and non-existence of the Law, which will regulate the questions
1 Saliu, Kurtesh, Constitutional law (in Albanian), 2004, p. 199; Škarič, Svetomir&Davkova-
Siljanovska, Gordana, Constitutional Law (in Macedonian), 2009, p. 714-716; Shasivari, Jeton,
Constitutional law (authorized lectures in Albanian), 2010, p. 364.
2 Spirovski, Igor, “The Independence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia:
Guarantees and Challenges” p. 7-8, available at:
http://www.venice.coe.int/WCCJ/Rio/Papers/MKD_Spirovski_E.pdf.
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connected with the Constitutional Court, gave a lot of space to the Constitutional
Court to regulate its status by itself. It is not a positive characteristic of the
constitutional system of RM, because it contains possibility the principle of “check
and balance” to be violated”1.
Also, the professor Karakamiseva has a dissenting opinion, when she states that:
“The fact that there is practically no country in the world that has a Constitutional
Court in its system that is not regulated with a law, or a constitutional law, above
all, the statutory matters related with the constitutional court, opens the issue
whether there is a need from this kind of a law in the Republic of Macedonia. This
need is obvious. The experience of other countries shows that regulating of the
status, organization and the competences of the Constitutional Court must be
organized with a separate law or by a separate constitutional law”2.
On this issue, it should be noted the assessment of a comparative study by Tudorel
Toader and Marieta Safta (2011)3 stating that, particular cases are highlighted in
the report of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina where in it is
emphasized that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not provide that
a Law on the Constitutional Court shall be enacted but it provides that the
Constitutional Court shall adopt its own Rules of the Court. Thus, the only act, in
addition to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which regulates the
activity of the Constitutional Court are the Rules of the Court which have force of
an organic law. Also, in this study, its highlighted that, the general rule that may be
emphasized is that the organization and functioning of the Constitutional Courts is
governed by a law, adopted by the legislator, which may be amended without the
consultation of the Constitutional Court, in the sense that there is no regulation that
might oblige the legislator to undertake such an action, a rule resulting from of the
general principle of separation of powers. Furthermore, to determine the activity
findings on the Constitutional Court of RM, it will be analyzed the statistical data
1 Treneska, Renata, “The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia: Proposals for
Legislative and Administrative Reform” IPFP, 2004. p. 17 available at:
http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00001916/01/treneska.pdf.
2 Karakamiševa, Tanja, Different Models for Protection of Constitutionality, Legality and
Independence of Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia, p. 4, available at:
http://www.venice.coe.int/WCCJ/Rio/Papers/MKD_Karakamiseva_E.pdf.
3 Tudorel Toader and Marieta Safta, Constitutional Justice: Functions and Relationship with the other
Public Authorities, General report prepared for the fifteenth Congress of the Conference of European
Constitutional Courts by the Constitutional Court of Romania, 2011, pp. 9-10, available at:
http://193.226.121.81/congres/raportgeneraleng.pdf.
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according to the annual reports of the Court for the period 2008-20121, based on
the number and the structure of the cases, by: a) the type of applicant's initiative; b)
the type of the contested act; and c) the jurisdiction of the Court.
In 2008, the Court has processed a total of 385 cases, of which 263 were admitted
in 2008, while 122 were transferred as pending since 2007, whereby from a total of
385 cases, 252 of them were completed, while 133 cases were not completed.
In 2009, the Court has processed a total of 423 cases, of which 290 cases were
admitted in 2009, while 133 were transferred as pending since 2008, whereby from
a total of 423 cases, 282 of them were completed, while 141 cases were not
completed.
In 2010, the Court has processed a total of 371 cases, of which 230 cases were
admitted in 2010, while 141 were transferred as pending since 2009, whereby from
a total of 371 cases, 245 of them were completed, while 126 cases were not
completed.
In 2011, the Court has processed a total of 361 cases, of which 236 cases were
admitted in 2011, while 125 were transferred as pending since previous years,
whereby from a total of 361 cases, 231 of them were completed, while 130 cases
were not completed. In 2012, the Court has processed a total of 335 cases, of which
205 cases were admitted in 2012, while 130 were transferred as pending since
previous years, whereby from a total of 335 cases, 239 of them were completed,
while 96 cases were not completed.
Table 1. Structure of the cases by the type of applicant's initiative in the period 2008-2012
Applicant 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Citizens 214 243 194 203 166
Political parties 3 3 3 1 4
Government 1 3 2 / 5
Enterprises 13 17 4 9 6
Local Government 17 12 2 3 5
Associations 13 7 15 10 9
Constitutional Court / / 1 / /
Other 2 5 9 10 10
In total 263 290 230 236 205
1 Annual Reports of Constitutional Court of RM 2008-2012, available at:
http://www.constitutionalcourt.mk/domino/WEBSUD.nsf.
JURIDICA
61
Table 2. Structure of the cases by the type of the contested acts in the period 2008-2012
Type of contested act 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Laws 164 191 155 143 103
Local acts 43 37 30 27 38
Acts of Government and
ministries
19 22 17 17 13
Collective agreements 5 2 3 3 1
Freedom protection 5 15 9 23 25
Acts of public enterprises 4 6 2 10 6
Acts of public services 3 5 3 6 3
Acts of political parties / / / / /
Other 20 12 11 7 16
In total 263 290 230 236 205
Table 3. Structure of the cases by the jurisdiction of the Court in the period 2008-2012
Type of the competence 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
I. Assessment of constitutionality and legality
by fields
257 273 220 213 179
1. Organization and work of state bodies 35 30 40 36 24
2. Finances and Taxes 25 18 16 13 4
3. Urban planning 27 26 16 24 17
4. Labor relations 25 16 21 18 15
5. Local self-government 22 21 14 8 17
6. Economy 16 14 6 9 3
7. Property legal relations 17 11 8 11 12
8. Pension and Disability Insurance 10 17 5 6 3
9. Health and Social Care 10 20 14 17 13
10. Safety and security 4 5 13 14 6
11. Public enterprises 5 4 1 1 4
12. Political parties 5 4 6 5 4
13. Religious freedom 1 3 1 / /
14. Transportation 5 14 4 2 1
15. Environment 4 3 / / 2
16. Education and science 11 11 6 3 7
17. Communal activity 4 3 3 4 8
Other 31 48 45 41 39
II. The request for the protection of rights and
freedoms
5 15 9 23 25
III. Conflicts of competency 1 1 1 / /
IV. The responsibility of the President of the
Republic
/ / / / /
V. Constitutionality of the programs of
political parties and associations
/ 1 / / 1
In total 263 290 230 236 205
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According to statistical data presented in the tables above regarding the activity of the
Court in the period 2008-2012, it can be draw the following findings:
Regarding the structure of the cases by the type of applicant's initiative it can be
seen that evidently dominates citizens (even if it decreased in 2010 and 2012),
followed by associations, local government and enterprises. In this regard, it should
be noted that during the last five years, only in one case in 2010 a court initiated
proceedings under its own initiative, which means that the Court very rarely initiate
the procedure ex officio. When talking about the citizens as the largest submitter of
the initiatives to the court, it is worth mentioning the example of the retired
lieutenant, the so-called “law breaker” Stamen Filipov, which is recorder not only
in RM but also abroad, because since 1993 he submitted more than 1,000
initiatives, so on its initiatives, so far are abrogated 236 law provisions, 9 plenty
laws and 64 by-law acts, so, at the moment 60 other his initiatives are awaiting for
Constitutional court decisions1.
Regarding the structure of the cases by the type of the contested acts, it should be
noted that evidently dominates laws (even if it decreased in recent years), followed
by freedom protection (which rises in recent years), local acts, acts of Government
and ministries and acts of the public enterprises.
Regarding the structure of the cases by the jurisdiction of the Court, it should be
noted that evidently dominates the assessments of constitutionality and legality
(even if it decreased in recent years), followed by the requests for the protection of
rights and freedoms (which rises in recent years). Also, it should be noted that,
very rarely are shown the functions of the Court on conflicts of competency and the
constitutionality of the programs of political parties and associations, while, on the
other hand, in any case has not shown the function on the responsibility of the
President of the Republic. When talking about the assessments of constitutionality
and legality by fields, it should be noted that dominates organization and work of
state bodies (even if it decreased in recent years), followed by urban planning,
labor relations, local self-government, health and social care, property legal
relations, economy and finances, and taxes.
A general conclusion of the functioning of the Constitutional Court consists of
apparent citizen activism about its activity, whereby citizens clearly dominate as
1 “Fighter against the stupid laws” VESTI online 09 April 2013 available at http://www.vesti-
online.com/Vesti/Ex-YU/304956/Borac-protiv-glupih-zakona. “Stamen–The “No”-Sayer”, available
at: http://www.facethebalkans.com/site/stamen-the-no-sayer/.
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the initiator of the proceedings, and, on the other hand, freedom protection is
increasing in recent years. Therefore, in the near future, it should be seriously
considered the possibility of incorporating the constitutional complaint in RM as a
remedy of fundamental rights protection before Constitutional court, according to
the experiences of Hungary, Slovenia, Germany, Slovakia, Spain and Croatia.
In addition, along with above conditions of the court, it should be emphasized the
considerable number of cases transferred from year to year, which raises the issue
of the factors which causes such a situation. In this context, it should be noted that
according to the annual report on financial situation and working conditions of the
Constitutional Court for 20121, during this year the activity of the Constitutional
Court was carried out with a budget of around 574,510 Euros, of which is mostly
for salaries of employees (about 69 percent), whereas, the revised budget reduced
funding for the Court to 7.46 percent. Also, the Court is one of the few state bodies
which in recent years receive 20% less than the funds needed, whereby in recent
years continues the trend of reduction of the staff personnel. Thus, as noted in this
report, limited financial and personnel resources of the Court negatively affects its
functioning, whereby these factors also has negative affect on modernization of
information technology, audio recording of sessions, training of professional staff
and finally, on meeting the financial obligations of membership in international
organizations.
5. Conclusions
After analyzing the organizational and functional aspects of the Constitutional
Court of the RM, it can be drawn the followed conclusions:
Regarding the selection of judges, according to the principle of separation of
powers, it needs to find an adequate and balanced solution to prevent political
influence of the legislative and executive power on the Constitutional Court of RM,
for example, three judges to be elected by Parliament, three judges to be elected by
President of the Republic and three judges to be elected by the Judicial Council
from among the judges, because the best form for election of the judges is when all
three segments of the state power (legislative, executive and judicial branches) are
equally involved in this process.
1 Annual Report of Constitutional Court of RM for 2012, available at:
http://www.ustavensud.mk/domino/WEBSUD.nsf.
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In addition, on the constitutional requirement which consists of the term
“outstanding member” of the legal profession that must be met for the candidates
for constitutional judges, this term remains imprecise, therefore, needs a closer
qualification in the near future, for example, more than a few years of professional
experience in the field of law, as for example, the Constitution of Kosovo, which
stipulates that the Constitutional Court shall be composed of nine judges who shall
be distinguished jurists of the highest moral character, with not less than ten years
of relevant professional experience.
Finally, a general conclusion on the functioning of the Constitutional Court of RM
for the period 2008-2012 consists of apparent citizen activism about its activity,
whereby citizens clearly dominate as the initiator of the proceedings, and, on the
other hand, freedom protection is increasing in recent years. Therefore, in the near
future, it should be seriously considered the possibility of incorporating the
constitutional complaint as a remedy of fundamental rights protection before
Constitutional court, according European standards and experiences.
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